runner¶
The runner block selects which agent runtime executes your skill or prompt and
carries runtime-specific knobs. Its type is a discriminator; the remaining fields are
read selectively. Fields a runner doesn't understand are ignored, and runners may warn
when an unsupported setting would otherwise be easy to miss.
Runtime, not backend
runner.type picks the agent (Claude Code, Cursor, Codex, an opaque CLI, or the OpenAI
Responses API). The execution backend (Local, Harbor, EvalHub) is a separate --runner
CLI flag, never a config key. See backends and the
runners concept for the distinction.
The five runner types¶
flowchart TD
T{runner.type}
T -->|claude-code<br/>default| CC[ClaudeCodeRunner<br/>claude --print]
T -->|cursor| CU[CursorAgentRunner<br/>cursor-agent --print]
T -->|codex| CX[CodexRunner<br/>codex exec]
T -->|cli| CLI[CliRunner<br/>arbitrary command template]
T -->|responses-api| RA[ResponsesAPIRunner<br/>OpenAI Responses + Skills API]
type |
Runtime | Use it for |
|---|---|---|
claude-code (default) |
Claude Code CLI in headless mode (claude --print --output-format …) |
The primary path — full tracing, tool interception, permission enforcement, subagent capture |
cursor |
Cursor Agent CLI in headless mode (cursor-agent --print --output-format …) |
Local Cursor-account execution with Cursor-managed model access and plugin loading. Local backend only — not available in EvalHub or Harbor. The Cursor CLI has no budget flag, so max_budget_usd is not enforced; bound spend with execution.timeout |
codex |
Codex CLI in non-interactive mode (codex exec --json) |
Native Codex execution, skill staging, JSONL usage parsing, and sandbox-mode mapping |
cli |
Any command you provide, via a placeholder template | Wrapping OpenCode, a custom agent, or a shell script. See the opaque CLI runner contract |
responses-api |
OpenAI Responses API with the Shell tool + Skills API | Apples-to-apples comparison of the same skill on an OpenAI model |
Which model ids a runner accepts
claude-code takes a bare Anthropic id, anthropic:/… or openrouter:/<author>/<slug>
— it is the only runner the harness-managed OpenRouter plan supports. The other four
pass the resolved skill model to their own CLI or API and authenticate through their
own environment (CURSOR_API_KEY, OPENAI_*). See
Model providers → Which role accepts which provider.
Field reference¶
Not every runner reads every field. The matrix below shows where each field lands.
| Field | Type | claude-code |
cursor |
codex |
cli |
responses-api |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
type |
str |
discriminator | discriminator | discriminator | discriminator | discriminator |
effort |
str (enum) |
--effort flag |
appended to a base --model as [effort=…]; existing Cursor effort variants pass through |
model_reasoning_effort |
{effort} placeholder |
— |
permission_mode |
str (enum) |
--permission-mode flag (also accepts manual, claude-code-only) |
plan → --mode plan; bypassPermissions → --force |
mapped to Codex sandbox mode | — | — |
settings |
dict |
merged into workspace .claude/settings.json |
binary only; other keys warn and are ignored |
-c config overrides for codex exec |
— | connection settings (see below) |
plugin_dirs |
list[str] |
one --plugin-dir per entry (workspace-staged copy for out-of-workspace paths) |
one --plugin-dir per entry (workspace-staged copy for out-of-workspace paths) |
skills copied into .agents/skills |
— | — |
env |
dict |
injected on the safe allowlist | injected into the subprocess env | injected on the safe allowlist | — (uses execution.env) |
— |
system_prompt |
str |
--append-system-prompt |
prepended to the prompt | prepended to the prompt | {system_prompt} placeholder |
developer message |
command |
str | list[str] |
— | — | — | required — command template | — |
workspace_mode |
None | "repo" |
harness-level (all runners) | harness-level | rejected | harness-level | harness-level |
Unset ≠ empty behavior
A field ignored by the active runner is harmless — it just does nothing. But two
fields are easy to misplace: runner.env has no effect on the cli runner
(which inherits the full caller environment and reads execution.env for
additions), and runner.settings means completely different things to
each runtime (see below). Cursor recognizes only binary in that mapping and
warns for other keys.
type¶
Selects the runner implementation. One of claude-code (default), cursor,
codex, cli, or responses-api. Any other value fails to resolve at run time.
effort¶
Reasoning-effort level for the agent. The accepted values are runner-specific:
| Runner | Valid values |
|---|---|
claude-code |
low, medium, high, xhigh, max |
codex |
minimal, low, medium, high, xhigh |
cursor |
Passed as the Cursor model's effort parameter; accepted values depend on the selected model |
An invalid value raises at construction time for claude-code and codex. Cursor
does not have a standalone --effort flag; it appends the value to the model ID,
for example gpt-5.4[effort=high]. If the model is already a Cursor catalog
variant such as gpt-5.4-medium, the runner passes that ID through unchanged
instead of producing an invalid compound ID such as
gpt-5.4-medium[effort=medium]. The selected Cursor model validates whether
the parameter is accepted. The CLI --effort flag overrides this field.
For the cli runner it is exposed as the {effort} placeholder (empty string if
unset); responses-api ignores it.
permission_mode¶
Claude Code permission mode, passed as the --permission-mode CLI flag. Because
it is a CLI flag (not a settings-file key), it applies even in the untrusted,
isolated per-case workspaces where .claude/settings.json permissions.allow /
additionalDirectories are trust-gated and the trust dialog can't appear in
headless mode. One of:
| Value | default |
acceptEdits |
plan |
auto |
dontAsk |
bypassPermissions |
manual |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
manual turns every unlisted tool call into a permission prompt. It is
claude-code-only: Cursor and Codex reject it. Agent judges are forced onto it
(together with --permission-prompts none, so a prompt nobody can answer is an
automatic denial), which is what makes a judge's allowed_tools authoritative —
see judges.
An invalid value raises at construction time for claude-code and codex; cli and
responses-api ignore the field. For a prompt-free, deny-by-default headless
run, pair dontAsk (allows only what's pre-approved) with a complete
permissions.allow list (fed to --allowed-tools, also
trust-independent). bypassPermissions skips all prompts — isolated
environments (containers/VMs) only.
Codex preserves the same intent using its available sandbox modes: plan maps to
read-only; bypassPermissions maps to Codex's explicit dangerous bypass; and the
remaining modes map to workspace-write. Codex cannot translate Claude Code's
fine-grained tool allow/deny rules exactly, so the runner emits a warning when such
rules are configured.
Cursor maps plan to cursor-agent --mode plan and
bypassPermissions to cursor-agent --force. The other common modes have no
exact Cursor equivalent and produce an explicit warning before Cursor's default
approval behavior is used. Prompt-only Cursor invocations clear permission_mode
so judges and synthetic generation are not launched in plan mode.
runner:
type: claude-code
permission_mode: dontAsk # default | acceptEdits | plan | auto | dontAsk | bypassPermissions | manual (claude-code only)
settings¶
A dict whose meaning depends on the runner:
Merged into each case workspace's generated .claude/settings.json (after the
harness defaults, so your scalars win and lists are extended). Use it to add
Claude Code settings — model defaults, env, MCP servers — without forking the
harness. The same merge implementation backs the extends
config overlay, where lists additionally dedupe and judges/steps merge by key.
Plugin hermeticity. In an isolated workspace the operator's
user-installed plugins (from ~/.claude/plugins/installed_plugins.json)
are disabled by default: the harness synthesizes
enabledPlugins: {<id>: false} for every installed plugin and merges it
before your settings, so an explicit entry re-enables a plugin with one
line. workspace_mode: repo disables nothing — that session runs in your
real environment. Plugins under test are immune: --plugin-dir plugins
register as <name>@inline and never appear in the registry.
The enabledPlugins pseudo-entry "*" steers the policy explicitly:
runner:
settings:
enabledPlugins:
"*": false # force hermeticity (also in repo mode)
"memsearch@my-marketplace": true # explicit entries win
"*" is harness-interpreted — upstream Claude Code has no
enabledPlugins wildcard — and is stripped before settings.json is
written, so the CLI never sees it. "*": true opts out of hermeticity
entirely. Configs that relied on an installed plugin silently loading
into case sessions fail loudly (Unknown command) after upgrading; the
fix is one explicit entry or a plugin_dirs entry.
Cursor recognizes binary to select a specific cursor-agent executable.
Other Cursor-specific connection, trust, header, MCP, and filesystem flags
are intentionally not part of the harness runner contract; configuring one
produces a warning and the key is ignored. Use runner.env for provider
environment variables such as CURSOR_API_KEY or CURSOR_API_ENDPOINT.
Connection and container settings for the OpenAI Responses API. Recognized keys:
base_url, api_key, default_model, network_policy, memory_limit_mb
(default 512). Missing base_url / api_key / default_model fall back to the
OPENAI_BASE_URL, OPENAI_API_KEY, and OPENAI_MODEL env vars.
settings.api_key is a secret authored in your config
The runner reads api_key from runner.settings as written — the one place a
provider credential can live in eval.yaml, outside the env-only rule that
applies to OPENROUTER_*. Leave it unset and export OPENAI_API_KEY instead;
the runner falls back to it.
Each key is passed to codex exec as a -c key=value config override.
model_reasoning_effort is also accepted here as a fallback when
runner.effort is unset; the top-level effort field takes precedence
and is validated against Codex's effort values.
The cli runner ignores settings.
plugin_dirs¶
claude-code, cursor, and codex. These runners copy plugin content into the case workspace
rather than exposing the configured path to the session. Claude Code stages each
entry's discoverable content (manifest, skill roots, commands/, agents/,
hooks/, scripts/) into .staged-plugins/ and passes the staged copy to
--plugin-dir — the configured path would otherwise land verbatim in session
context, where Bash (not path-gated) can follow it out of the workspace. An entry
already inside the workspace is passed through unchanged, and
workspace_mode: repo skips staging for Claude Code and Cursor — the workspace is
the real project there, so there is nothing to isolate. Cursor applies common
permissions through a temporary project-local .cursor/cli.json and restores the
original file after the run; in isolated mode it follows the same --plugin-dir
staging path and embeds the selected SKILL.md in its prompt because Cursor does
not consume the harness's slash-command target directly. Codex copies
each plugin's skills into the case workspace's .agents/skills directory for the
duration of the run. Relative paths are always
resolved from the project root.
A lexically external path such as ../shared-skills is an explicit opt-in like an
absolute path; a path declared inside the project may not escape through a symlink.
env¶
claude-code, cursor, and codex. Extra environment variables injected into the
runner subprocess, additive to the runner's built-in safe allowlist (PATH, HOME,
provider credentials, MLFLOW_TRACKING_URI, …). A value starting with $ is resolved
from the caller's environment; missing vars are dropped. Cursor reads its provider
credentials (e.g. CURSOR_API_KEY, CURSOR_API_ENDPOINT) from here — not from
execution.env, which has a different scope.
runner:
type: claude-code
env:
ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN: $ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN # forward from caller
FEATURE_FLAG: "enabled" # literal
Where env vars belong
runner.env forwards vars into the agent runtime. To make a var available to
the skill and its hooks inside each case workspace, use
execution.env instead. The cli runner reads only
execution.env — runner.env is a no-op there. See
environment variables.
Managed keys under an OpenRouter plan
While models.skill is openrouter:/…, the provider plan owns the agent's routing
variables on runner.env and runner.settings.env as on every other env surface,
and its block reaches the agent through the runner's own channel (overlay,
--agent-env, pod spec + Secret), winning over runner.env — the rule is spelled
out once in models.providers → Validation.
system_prompt¶
Extra system-prompt text prepended to the agent's context.
claude-code— passed via--append-system-prompt, composed with the harness prompt.cursor/codex— prepended to the user prompt.cli— exposed as the{system_prompt}placeholder in the command template.responses-api— sent as adeveloperrole message.
command¶
cli only, and required for it. A command template — a string (shell-parsed via
shlex) or a list of arguments (safer; no shell parsing). Placeholders are substituted
before execution and string values are shell-quoted.
Common placeholders (full list in the contract):
| Placeholder | Value |
|---|---|
{agent} |
Skill name (empty in prompt mode) |
{workspace} |
Absolute case workspace path |
{output_dir} |
{workspace}/output (write artifacts here) |
{model} |
Resolved model (--model or models.skill) |
{subagent_model} |
Subagent model (empty if unset) |
{args} |
Resolved execution.arguments |
{effort} / {system_prompt} |
From runner.effort / runner.system_prompt |
{timeout} / {max_budget_usd} |
From execution (budget is advisory only) |
{field} |
Any field from the case input.yaml |
Contract obligations
An opaque command must exit non-zero on failure and write artifacts to
{output_dir} (or the outputs[*].path dirs). To surface token/cost data it must
write {output_dir}/metrics.json — otherwise cost tables are empty. Tool
interception, stream-json tracing, subagent capture, and budget enforcement are
Claude-Code-only and do not work with cli. See the
cross-runner cookbook.
workspace_mode¶
Execution context. Validated at load time — only None or "repo" are accepted (a
typo raises rather than silently changing behavior). Claude Code, Cursor, and the
opaque runner honor repo; Codex rejects it because the harness cannot enforce
repository protections there.
| Value | Meaning |
|---|---|
unset (None) |
Isolated workspace (default) — each case runs in its own temp workspace with symlinked project resources |
repo |
In-repo — the agent runs against the real repository checkout |
workspace_mode: repo is meaningful for prompt mode evals using Claude Code or
Cursor that need the agent to navigate the actual repository (e.g. agentic-docs
testing). Pair it with
permissions to keep the agent from writing to the repo.
execution:
prompt: "{{ input.prompt }}"
runner:
type: claude-code
workspace_mode: repo # navigate the real repository
Examples¶
See also¶
- runners concept — how runtimes differ and when to reach for each
- models — model-per-role and the
{model}/{subagent_model}resolution - execution —
execution.env, timeout, budget, parallelism - permissions — allow/deny, essential for
workspace_mode: repo - headless execution — how the Claude Code runner is driven non-interactively